



PRIVACY & UTILITY ANALYSIS OF THE TOPICS API FOR THE WEB

(PETS'24 - SecWeb'24)

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MADS&P

MOTIVATION


Topics API for the Web





Third-party cookies

Fingerprinting



Interest-based advertising

Google's Goals

It must be difficult to reidentify significant numbers of users across sites using just the API.

Browsing

history


API caller


Website


- 2. The API should provide a subset of the capabilities of third-party cookies.
- 3. The topics revealed by the API should be less personally sensitive about a user than what could be derived using today's tracking methods.
- 4. Users should be able to understand the API, recognize what is being communicated about them, and have clear controls. This is largely a UX responsibility but it does require that the API be designed in a way such that the UX is feasible.

OVERVIEW

Systematic and Reproducible Analysis








Simulations on synthetic and real data

Threat Model



UTILITY EVALUATION

Classification Comparison

- Manual Verification (385 domains)
- Static Mapping (10k domains)
- Cloudflare Radar Categorization (348k domains)


Result: at least 1 true topic aligned with ground truth in about 60% of cases

Abuse Potential

Topics (word): Comics (batman), Dance (dance), ... Domain: example.com, ...

Crafted subdomains: batman.example.com, dance.example.com, ...

350 topics x top 10k domains = 3.5M subdomains



Result: classification can be **influenced**

PRIVACY EVALUATION


Identification of Noisy and Real Topics

Asymmetric topics distribution on the web: our classifier considers every topic that does not appear at least on 10 websites among the top 1M as noisy.

Repetitions leak real topics: Coupon Collector's Problem.

- One-shot: 25% of noisy topics removed.
- Multi-shot: 49-94% (15-30 epochs) removed.

Result: plausible deniability can be refuted



Topics distribution on top 1M most visited websites (CrUX)



Topics calculation at end of epoch e₀

Call to
browsingTopics()> during e₀

Topics

taxonomy

Static mapping Topics classifier

Random topic drawn

from taxonomy

User's top T=5 topics \longrightarrow $[t_{-2}, t_{-1}, t_{-3}]$

Top **T=5** topics

Topics output

to API caller in

random order

Real: 🚣 🗏 🧷 🎜 ofo

Topics

of top -#- Median ···■··· Max


Simulation on 250k stable users

Epochs

Re-identification Experiment

Simulation: quantification of the fingerprinting risk of Topics for an arbitrarily large population of users (250k) over time (30 epochs).

k-anonymity across time: How "difficult" is it to re-identify "significant numbers of users across sites"?



Result: users can be **fingerprinted by the Topics API**

Measurement on Real Browsing Histories

Real data: 1207 users from Germany over 5 weeks in October 2018.

- Uniqueness: 94% have unique topics profiles.
- **Stability:** at least 47% have 3 or more stable topics.

lopics	Users re-
observation(s)	identified
1	46%
2	55%
3	60%

Result: third parties can **track** users across websites by observing their topics

TAKEAWAYS

systematization in their approach.

Topics API can be used to Fingerprint Users

- Topics can not guarantee non re-identification across websites to all users.
- Users have stable and unique web behaviors that need to be considered.
- Google's non-reproducible analyses are disconnected from reality and lack

Some Utility Retained, but Classification can be Manipulated

- Topics returned are somewhat aligned with users' interests.
- Utility buckets introduced after advertisers' feedback is making topics profiles more unique (privacy-utility tradeoff).
- Unclear if Google's current mitigation (external attestation mechanism) will prevent further abuse.

Need for a (Research) Sandstorm through the Privacy Sandbox

- Call for reproducible analyses and release of tools and datasets.
- More evaluations are required to understand all potential impacts.
- Launch of a new research hub at https://privacysandstorm.com



https://yohan.beugin.org



